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OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ENGINEERING COMMISSION,
D. H. WHITTENBURG, Chairman; H. J. CORLEISSEN and
LAYTON MAxFIELD, Members

of the Engineering Commission,_
Plaintiff an~d Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
?867

BURTON F. PEEK and CHARLES
D. WIMAN, Trustees under the

Will and of the Estate of
CHARLES H. DEERE, Deceased,
Defendants and Appellants.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF FACT·S
On December 23, 1953, this court rendered an
opinion and judgment granting appellants a new trial.
Respondents hereby respectfully apply for a rehearing
upon the grounds hereinafter set forth.
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POINTS RELIED UPON
This court erred:

1. In holding that the trial court should have
admitted evidence of the separate value of the water
system located upon the land sought to be condemned.
2. In holding that trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence of the value of other property
similar to that sought to be condemned.
3. In holding that it was prejudicial error for
the trial court to strike from appellant's answer certain
allegations with reference to severance damages.
We shall discuss these points in their order.
ARGUMENT

Evidence of Separate Value of Water System.
The water right was appurtenant to the realty
and the water system, consisting of storage tanks,
conduits of the distributing system, water· hydrants,
etc., were, of course, improvements. The ·Statute,
Section 104-6-1 (Utah Code Annotated 1953, Sec.
78-34-10) provides that the jury must ascertain and
assess:
''The value of the property condemned and
all improvements thereon appertaining to the
realty,'' etc.
This Statute has been construe-d so many times
by the courts that there ought to be no difference of
opinion as to its meaning. In the following cases cited
in respondent's brief, pages 31 and 3 2, it is held that
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while improvements may be described in detail by the
witnesses (as was done in this case), the value of improvements separate from thee realty may not be
shown. Vallejo v. Home Savings Bank (Calif.) 140
Pac. 974, Los Angeles v. Klinger (Calif.) 25 Pac. 2d
826. In Shouder Creek Co. v. Harold (W. Va.) 45
S.E. 2d 513, it is said:
"To establish the value of land, the presence
of crops, trees, shrubs and timber upon it, and of
coal, oil, gas, stone and other minerals and valuable deposits upon or under the surface may be
shown. . . . Consideration, however, should be
confined to the land and its contents and elements,
together and as an entirety when there is no separate ownership with respect to any of them ....
Compensation for land should be ascertained and
determined on the basis of its value at the time
it is taken or damaged. All of its components
may be considered in arriving at the value of the
unit, the land itself, but none of them, when not
separately owned may be given an independent
value from the land as land.''
In Seattle, etc., Co. v. Roeder (Wash.) 70 Pac.
498, the court in upholding an instruction by the trial
judge uses this language:
''If a piece of land taken contains valuable
improvements, those improvements apart from
the land may not be considered; yet certainly the
character, nature and extent of the impro.vements
and the revenue derived therefrom are as essntial
to be considered in arriving at the value of the land
as the land itself, or the uses to which it may be
put."
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None of the, authorities cited by respqndent, or
a~ y others, are discussed or referred to in this court's
opinion in .support of its holding: but the court disposes of the matter in the following language:
"Respondents objected to this evidence on
the ground that there· was no showing that appellants had any water right, but the court excluded the proffered evidence without giving appellants an opportunity to make a showing of
such ownership apparently on the ground that
such evidence was not admissible even if such
showing were made, Respondents' own witnesses treated this as a valuable property right of
appellants. It undoubtedly would have aided
the jury in determining the true value of appellants' property had all of these details ·been shown
to them, for certainly they could more accurately
assess the valuation of this property if they had
before them the value which the experts placed
on this system in arriving at their overall value
of the property, and could test such valuation by
comparison with the opinion of any expert on
the value of that kind of property. The value
of such a utility is especially one which calls for
expert opinion because such property is not bought
and sold every day on the open market, so expert
opinion thereon is almost mandatory.''
While counsel for appellant did not include in
the record before this court proof of ownership of the
water right, they did offer proof thereof which was
received; however, it is truet as stated by the court,
that evidence of the value of the water right and water
system separate and apart from the value of the land,
was excluded.
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If the above declaration of this court is to be
the law of this State in eminent domain actions; of
course, the decision must be followed, but the· conse . .
quences of it, we feel, are not fully appreciated by the
court for, according to .our construction of the ·court's
language, it means that if a tract on which a home
is located is condemned, the court must admit evidence of the separate value of the house, of the sprink . .
ling system, of the heating equipment, electric and gas
conduits, orchard and shrubbery. They are improvements just as the water system is an improvement. No
real property, so far as we are advised, whereon improvements have been placed, is valued in any such
fashion. A purchaser or an appraiser goes over the
property, notes the character and structure of the buildings· thereon, their state of repair and ·what facilities
are available for the· enjoyment of the property;·
whether there is curb 'and gutter; and the condition
of the premises generally~ and then makes a valuation of the entire property as a unit, and that is the
method which has been adopted in condemnation proceedings· in the states where the statute ·reads exactly·
as does our statute.· Of course, ·it is the pre·rogative
of this court to refuse to follow the construction placed
by other courts on a statute identical with our own,
but if the court determines to adhere to the ruling of
which we complain, we must respectfully request that
it make definite and certain its intention that each and
all improvements on the condemned property shall
have a separate value placed thereon. This definiteness is necessary to guide the court on the re-trial.
If the water system is to be valued separately, we
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ought to know whether the court intends that there
shall be a separate valuation of the gas and electric distributing systems, the curb and gutter, and whether or
not the constituent parts of the water system shall likewise be valued separately in order to arrive at the
total value of said system. For example, the water
system consists of two very large storage tanks; are
they to be separately valued? The water right from
the spring and the pipes and conduits which were
designed to convey the water to the residential area,
must they be separately valued? The trial court and
the parties to this action ought to know whether
there are any limitations as to the details of valuation so that error will not be committed. We believe there can be no difference in principle with respect to the valuation of land together with the improvements and the value of land with mineral deposits. Improvements are as much a part of the land
as the mineral within it, and it is uniformly held that
·where there is no separate ownership of the minerals
apart from the land, minerals may not be separately
valued. In the note to 156 A.L.R., page 1416, the
authorities are collected in support of the following
text:
HWith remarkable unantmtty the courts
hold that in determining the compensation in
eminent domain proceedings for the land to be
condemned, the existence of valuable mineral deposits in the land taken constitutes an element
which may be take·n into consideration if and insofar as it influences the market value of the land.
The reason for this rule is that the measure of
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compensation in eminent domain proceedings is
the market value of the land to be condemned as
a whole with due consideration of all the components that make for its value. This rule has
been expressed in a great number of decisions and
has also been recognized by all the leading textwriters on this subject. It has been applied indiscriminately to all forms of mineral deposits,
such as limestone, ore, gold, fire clay, coal, sand
and gravel, and stone.
''Occasionally the rule has been expressed by
the negative statement that the award may not be
reached by separately evaluating the land and the
deposits, since the latter, being only one element
among many in determining the market value of
the land, cannot be considered as an independent
factor the value of which is to be simply added
to the value of the land.''

EVIDENCE OF VALUE OF SIMILAR LAND
Here, again, in deciding that the value of similar
land should have been received, this court has either
disregarded, or rejected as unsoun,d in principle, the
authorities cited in our Brief at pages 19-23. We think
the court should reconsider this question. As stated
in Watkins v. Railroad Co. (Iowa) 113 N.W. 924,

925:
"The practically universal rule is to the effect that such testimony is not admissible as substantive evidence of the value of the property
which is the subject of the controversy."
In that case, as here, the offer of such testimony
was not intended simply to show the qualification of
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the witness, .but was intended to adduce substantive
evidence of the: value of the land to be condemned.
In· Weber County v. Ritchie, 98 Utah 276, 96
Pac. 2d 744, plaintiff offered evidence of what another· land owner had received for his land for the
same project. It appeared that the amount received
was for value, plus segregation damage, and this court
held that even if such had not been the case, it was
questionable whether such evidence was proper under
the definition of market value as applicable to condemnation proceedings, and in Telluride Power Co.
v. Bruneau, 41, U tab 4, 125 Pac. 311, the court holds
that it was not prejudicial error to 'exclude evidence
of comparative values on direct exami~ation, such evidence being admissible only on cross-examination to
test the qualification of a witness who ·has testified to
the value of the property sought to be condemned. In
that case -a witness had testified to the value of the
land. The following is from the court's opinion:
0

'

•

· ''Then, in response to further questions propounded to him on his direct examination he-further stated· that he was acquainted with, sales of
lands similar in character to the defendant's land,
and that he had knowledge of the sale of a
particular tract near the defendant's land, and that
he obtained such information from the agent of
the parties who had purchased the tract. Thereupon the court, on its own motion, observed:
~'You are seeking to prove particular sales, are
you? Counsel for Plaintiff: Yes, sir." The court
stated: ~~That is not admissible under the rule
on direct examination''---and observed that such
things may be inquired about on cross-examina-
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tion, and then on redirect, but not on the direct
examination. ''Counsel: Do I understand the
court to rule, then, that the witness on direct
examination cannot give his statement of particular values of similar property? Court: Yes;
that is the uniform practice." This ruling is complained of. As stated in 1 Elliott, Ev., sect~on
180, Jones, Ev. ( 2d Ed.), section 16 8, and 13
Ency. Ev., pp. 457-463, there is a marked conflict
of opinion as to the competency of evidence on direct examination to show the sale price of other
lands of general similarity in location, character,
and adaptability to use of the lands sold with
those the value of which is in question, and of
sales made about the time the value of the latter
must be established. The cases supporting the
affirmative and those the negative of the proposition are there noted. Even though the conclusion should be reached that such sales may properly be shown on the direct examination, yet we
are clear1y of the opinion that in this instance the
pl~intiff was not harmed by the ruling.
The
witness .had already stated that he had bought
and sold lands; that he knew of sales of lands
similar to that of the defendant; that he knew
the market value of such lands and the market
value of the defendant's land, and stated what
that was, and the amount which in his opinion
the value of the defendant's land was depreciated
by reason of the construction of the power line
over it. In such case the plaintiff was not prejudiced even though it be assumed that it, on the
direct examination of the witness, was entitled to
show sales of other lands. (Seattle ~ M. Ry. Co.
v. Gilchrist, 4 Wash. 509, 30 Pac. 739; Teele v.
Boston, 165 Mass. 88, 42 N.E. 506; Sargent v.
Merrimac, 196 Mass. 1711 81 N.E. 970, 11 L.
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R. A. (N.S.) 996, 124 Am. St. Rep. 528.) At
any rate, it is not such an error, if there be one,
as requires a reversal of the judgment."
In the case at bar the expert witnesses had all testified that they had bought and sold lands, that they
knew of the sales of numerous subdivisions in and
about Salt Lake City; that they knew the market
value of such lands and of appellants' land the value
of which they gave, just as witnesses testified in the
Telluride-Bruneau case.
If the refusal to admit evidence of the value of
other lands was not prejudicial error in the Telluride-Bruneau case, why should it be prejudicial here?
Were we not justified and was the trial court not justified in relying upon the former ruling of this court
that such evidence might be excluded without prejudice? Are we to be obliged to re-try this case for an
error which this court in its former decision declared
was not an error? We again respectfully request this
court to reconsider its decision and to recognize the
rule that it has itself announced and to also consider
the cases cited in our brief which apply not only to
acreage tracts, but to subdivision lots as well. (Respondent's Brief, pages 24-28.)
The Supreme Court of Oregon gives a very cogent
reason why evidence of the sale price of other lands
is not admissible:
"Over the objection of the plaintiff, 'the
court received in evidence the testimony of the
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witness, B. A. Kliks, an owner of land in the vicinity of the land being condemned, that a real
estate man had made him an offer of $1,600.00
for an acre and a half of his land. The ruling
is assigned as error. The assignment must be
sustained. It is well settled in this and other
jurisdictions that offers of sale and purchase of
similar land in the vicinity are inadmissible, for
the reason, among others, that such evidence
places before the court or the jury an absent person's declaration or opinion as to value, while
depriving the adverse party of the benefit of crossexamination. Portland ~ 0. C. Ry. v. Ladd
Estate Co. 79 or 517, 155 P. 1192; Hine v. Manhattan R. Co. 132 N.Y. 477, 30 N.E. 985, 15
L. R. A. 591; Davis v. Charles River Branch
. Railroad Co. 65 Cush, Mass. 506; Helena Power
Transmission Co. v. McLean, 38 Mont. 388, 99
P. 1061; Blincoe v. Choctaw, 0. ~ W. R. Co.
16 Okla. 286, 83 Pac. 903, 4. L. R. A. N.S. 890,
8 Ann Cas. 689; 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain
996, Para. 351; 2 Lewis on Eminent Domain,
1146, Para. 666. Defendants' counsel do not
question the rule, but they seek to justify introduction of the otherwise incompetent evidence because of certain testimony concerning Mr. Kliks'
property given by one of the witnesses for the
plaintiff. This evidence, however, was brought
out on cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness; and, in any event, nothing that he or any
other witness testified to warranted or excused
violation of the rule of evidence in question."
State v. Cerruti (Ore.) 214 Pac. (2) 346.
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STRIKING OUT ALLEGATIONS· IN__ _
APPELLANTSt ANSWER AS To·
SEVERANCE DAMAGES
· There w~s no pre j.udi~ial e~ror iri striking these
allegations if appellants might have offered evidence
of such. damage with the stricken allegations omitted.
It· is clearly pointed out in our brief at pages 35-36
that under the allegations of the complaint and appellants' denial in their answer, ptoof of severance
damage might have been offered. In th¢ complaint it
is alleged:
"1 0. That each of the parcels or tracts
sought to be condemned :as hereinabove referred
to and set forth
the whole of an entire parcel
or tract of property or interest in or to property
owned by the aforesaid defendants." (R. 19.)

is

In their answer, appellants denied this allegation
and prayed for severance damages in the sum of $14,000.00. Appellants elected to make no proof disputing the allegation that the property sought to be condemned "is the whole of an entire parcel or tract,"
and in their answer they gave no description of other
land not taken, claimed to have been damaged by segregation. Furthermore, they offered no proof that
they had other lands that were severeC;l from the condemned area nor did they offer to prove that they were
damaged.
It was not prejudicial error to strike the alle·gations with reference to severance damages for the additional reason that if appellants were obliged to file
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any answer (see 18 American Jurisprudence, page 970,

Section 326), there was no requirement that their answer contained more than a mere appearance. Our
statute, Section 78-34-7, provides:

"All persons in occupation of or having or
claiming an interest in any of the pro.perty described in the complaint or in the damages for
the taking thereof, though not named, may app·ear, plead and defend, if in respect to his own
property or interest or that claimed by him, in
the same manner as if named in the complaint.''
(Italics ours.)

The Supreme Court of Montana, construing an
identical statute, said:
"The only effect of a default is to shut out
the defendants from participating in the proceedings. The court must nevertheless determine
whether the use for which the property is sought
to be appropriated is a public use, limit the amount
taken to the necessities of the case and ascertain
the damages .under the procedure and in accordance with the standard provided for in Sections
2220, 2221 and 2224.

*

*

*

*

"But counsel says .that defendants' claims
for damages should have been set up in their answers by way of counterclaim, thus giving plaintiff notice of their character and amount so that
it could be prepared to meet them. The ans\ver
to this contention is that there is no provision in
the title touching condemnation proceedings, reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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quiring defendants to set up their claims for damages in their pleadings in any form.''
The damages must of necessity be ascertained
because under the Constitution of this State, providing that property may not be taken for public use
without just compensation, the court must at all events
determine what is "just compensation." In the same
-case, the Montana court uses this language:
''Objection was made to certain evidence
tending to show damage to portions of defendants' lands not actually traversed by the railroad
and not described in the petition. It is said now
that the claims for damages in this behalf should
have been specially pleaded, and plaintiff cites several Illinois cases in support of this contention,
among them: Stetson v. C. ~ E. R. Co., 75 Ill.
74; Chicago ~ I. R. Co. v. Hopkins, 90 Ill. 316;
Johnson v. Freeport ~ M. R. Co., Ill Ill. 413.
It will be seen on examination of these cases, however, that the Illinois statute permits the defendant in such cases to file a cross-petition in order
to set forth more fully and accurately his
claim. But our statute contains no such provision. Besides, as we have seen, the lands of the
different defendants in this case are all compact
bodies, and it is clearly within the purview of
the court's duty to ascertain what damages have
accrued, not only as to the part described in the
complaint, but also to the whole of the body, a
part of which only is taken. Such damages are
not special in the proper meaning of that term."
Yellowstone Park R. Co. v. Bridger Coal
Co., 87 Pac. 963-966.
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How then can it be said that the court committed error in striking out allegations 'vhich appellants
were never under any necessity to set forth in their answer?
We respectfully submit that the court's decision
is entirely erroneous in holding:
(a) That the water system should have
been valued separately;
(b) That evidence should have been received of the value of similar lands,
·and
(c) That appellants were prejudiced by the
striking out of the allegations in their
amended answer with reference to sev~
erance damages.
We cannot think that this court upon further
reflection will desire this decision to stand. Furthermore, appellants were never really dissatisfied with the
award of the jury. What they wanted was interest
to which
from the date of the service of summons,
.
this court very properly holds they were not entitled.
In proof of the fact that appellants 'vere satisfied
except as to the matter of interest, the court will find
at pages 21 and 22 of appellants' brief the following:

HA New Trial Is Not Required.
''Ma thematically, the interest on the fair
market value of the defendants' property between
the ,date of the injury and the time when the
amount of the award was determined can readily
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be computed. At six per cent it amounts to
$24,799.32 for the period July 12, 1951 until
. May 10, 1952.
"This amount the court below could and
should have included in the judgment on the
verdict, no jury question bein-g involved. St.
Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Oliver (Okla.), 87 P. 423t
2 Lewis on Eminent Domain, S. 742, at page
1324.
"This error can be corrected by simple direction of this court, no new trial or resubmission
to the jury being required.''
Why should this court put the parties to the
great e·xpense of a protracted retrial when appellants
themselves say that it is not necessary and that all they
ask is a computation of interest and when, as we have
shown in the preceding pages of this argument, no
prejudicial error was committed?
We respectfully submit that a rehearing should
be granted for the correction of the manifest errors in
the court's decision.
E. R. CALLISTER, JR.,
Attorney General

JESSER. S. BUDGE,
Special Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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